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Margaret Cavendish’s The Description of a New World, called the Blazing World 
(1666) has often been read as a work that both draws on the utopian genre and 
complicates it.
1
 While it makes direct reference to earlier utopian models, it does not 
follow their course, something that is made explicit from the outset. Unlike the mariners 
of Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) and Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis (1627), who 
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willingly undertake their perilous voyages into unknown provinces and are located 
within the camaraderie of a crew, Cavendish’s protagonist is a ‘young Lady’, exiled 
from her own community when she is abducted by a foreign merchant, who ‘steal[s] her 
away’ to sea (p. 125).2 But as a result of divine vengeance, a storm blows the vessel off 
course to the North Pole and the merchant and his crew all freeze to death, while the 
‘virtuous Lady survives’ (p. 125). Bacon’s shipwrecked mariners weather a tempest to 
find themselves, like More’s, within a remote domain of this world. However, in 
Cavendish’s narrative not only are the lady and crew ‘driven to the very end or point of 
the Pole’ of their own world, ‘but even to another Pole of another world, which joined 
close to it’, whereby the boat carrying the lady is ‘forced into’ the new world, the 
Blazing World, to which hers is adjoined (p. 126). There she is shown ‘all civility and 
kindness imaginable’ by the anthropomorphic creatures who inhabit this ‘strange ... 
place’ (p. 127) and, having been ‘conceived’ by its Emperor ‘to be some goddess’, he 
‘made her his wife’ (p. 132). But stranger still and in unprecedented opposition to 
conventional seventeenth-century wifely duties, the Emperor also ‘gave her an absolute 
power to rule and govern all that world as she pleased’ (p. 132). Where More’s and 
Bacon’s visitors are placed in the role of admiring observers of the communities they 
enter, whose operations they record as a means of beneficial instruction to the ‘weal-
public’, Cavendish’s protagonist is allowed not only to become an agent of action, 
having been a puppet of fate, but also a sovereign self.
3
 Moreover, far from offering an 
ideal society, or ‘the best ... mould of a commonwealth’,4 simply waiting to be 
discovered, Cavendish’s text takes an interrogative approach to the new world its 
protagonist encounters. It provides a playful commentary on the social makeup of the 
Blazing World, testing out the various types of community – political, scientific, 
religious – it comprises and revealing how they are questioned, altered and disrupted by 
the interventions of its new inhabitant.
5
 
   
In addition, the trope of interconnected worlds underscoring The Blazing World bears a 
tangential relationship to a seventeenth-century discourse of a particular type of 
community – that of ideal friendship. This essay will suggest that the transformative 
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qualities of this trope lie at the heart of The Blazing World’s utopian vision. But, like the 
other forms of community the text portrays, the concept of ideal friendship does not go 
unquestioned and shows the text’s acute awareness of its potential pitfalls, especially 
when located within a feminine form. Indeed, Cavendish uses the utopian mode in order 
to probe the ethos and values of its abstract ideals. As in the paradise of Milton’s epic, 
discussed in this collection by Rosamund Paice, The Blazing World shows how human 
relations in practice unsettle theoretical models. 
 
 
I. Contiguous Worlds 
 
The image of two self-contained worlds conjoined is central to early modern accounts 
of friendship and their classical antecedents, providing a figure for the concept of ‘one 
soul in bodies twain’ or ‘Two friends, one soul’, as Aristotle, citing Euripides, puts it.6 
John Donne provides a particularly striking version of this concept, describing 
friendship’s accord as ‘two temperate regions girded in’ in his verse letter ‘To Sir Henry 
Wotton’;7 while for Cavendish’s close contemporary, Katherine Philips, ideal friends 
‘are, and yet they are not, two’, comprising ‘Two bodyes and one minde’.8 Furthermore, 
willing submission to friendship’s claims paradoxically grants its subjects authority and 
liberty so as to create a new mode of being.
9
 As Philips’s speaker, Orinda, suggests in 
‘Friendship’s Mysterys, to my dearest Lucasia’: ‘We are our selves but by rebound, / 
And all our titles shuffled so, / Both Princes, and both subjects too’.10 While early 
modern concepts of ideal friendship take a variety of forms, they follow their classical 
precedents in commonly incorporating values of virtue, wisdom, equality, justice and 
integrity, and in making ‘mutual moral improvement and enhanced self-knowledge’  
their object.
11
 Perfect amity is thus frequently presented as forming an exclusive realm 
of its own, offering a ‘utopian “counterpolity”’ that operates independently from and is 
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often unseen by the wider community, while of necessity co-existing alongside or 
within this larger frame.
12
 As we shall see, Cavendish shows that she was well-
acquainted with various versions of this well-documented discourse.
13
 
 
However, while these figures of two spheres ‘yoked together’ and worlds within worlds 
echo through Cavendish’s narrative, they are presented in a variety of often problematic 
permutations.
14
 The form in which this image is initially introduced indeed raises 
problems: where for Montaigne ‘true and perfect friendship’ ‘engender[s]’ a ‘congruity 
and affinity’ that is ‘equable’ and ‘equitable’, the contiguous relationship between the 
Empress’s native world and the Blazing World is clearly not one of ideal union or 
proportion and does not signal two in one, but rather unlikeness and clearly 
differentiated alternatives.
15
 
 
In turn, in spite of the insistent stress on the Blazing World’s unity, it embodies a range 
of fragmented, self-contained domains, comprising many islands of different climates 
that, unlike New Atlantis’s primarily generic citizens, are inhabited by a wide variety of 
beings with different interests and perspectives, from ‘the ice strange creatures in shape 
like bears’ who greet the young lady to the ‘immaterial spirits’ to whom she addresses 
theological questions once she is Empress (pp. 127, 165). Indeed, in spite of its 
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appearance of ‘peace and tranquillity’ and the civility with which its inhabitants greet 
each other (pp. 130, 127), the Blazing World is underscored by anxieties about sedition. 
Perhaps in an ironic reference to Bacon’s omission of ‘a frame of Laws’ in his 
representation of New Atlantis’s compliant society,16 we learn that the Blazing World 
‘had so few laws’ because ‘many laws made many divisions, which most commonly did 
breed factions, and at last break out into open wars’ (p. 134). Even so, when she is made 
Empress, the young lady is given attire that includes ‘a buckler, to signify the defence of 
her dominions’ and ‘a spear ... which signified that she was ready to assault those that 
proved her enemies’ (p. 133), apparel that, while symbolising protection, also suggests 
the potential threat of invasion and civil strife. 
    
Moreover, the various internal communities over which the Empress presides are by no 
means ideal and signal the contingency of her self-determining powers. Soon after she 
is given sovereignty, the Empress ‘erected schools, and founded several societies’ in 
accordance with the ‘profession’ that ‘was most proper for the nature of’ the ‘species’ of 
her varied inhabitants, so the fox-men become her politicians, ‘the spider- and lice-men 
her mathematicians, the jackdaw-, magpie- and parrot-men her orators and logicians’ 
and so forth (p. 134). However, she is often unsettled by the results of her specialists’ 
investigations when she questions them over their areas of expertise, discovering that 
‘wheresoever is learning, there is most commonly also controversy and quarrelling’ (p. 
202). For example, when recounting their findings from observations made through the 
use of telescopes, the bear-men ‘fell into a great dispute’ (p. 140). Nor do they simply 
succumb to the Empress’s authority when she decides that such instruments are ‘false 
informers’ and on two occasions commands the bear-men to break them (p. 141). 
Instead, they persuade her ‘to spare our glasses’ and she relents on condition that they 
‘cause no factions or disturbances in state, or government’ (p. 142). Similarly, the 
enquiries of her chemists, the ape-men, ‘concerning the primitive ingredients of natural 
bodies’ produce ‘a great many debates and contentions’ (pp. 153-4) and, in a 
mischievous allusion to the practical and socially efficacious claims of New Atlantis’s 
scientific community, Salomon’s House, the Empress commands them to ‘busy 
yourselves with such experiments as may be beneficial to the public’ (p. 155). 
Supporting this policy, though, her anatomists subsequently refuse to comply with her 
request ‘to dissect such kinds of creatures as are called monsters’ on the grounds that ‘it 
would be but an unprofitable and useless work’ (p. 157). The Empress’s scientific 
communities thus signal areas of potential disruption, as well as revealing the limits of 
her command over her new environment, something that is emphasised when we later 
learn that ‘although she possesses a whole world, yet enjoys she but a part thereof; 
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neither is she so much acquainted with it, that she knows all the places, countries and 
dominions she governs’ (p. 186). Her sovereignty is partial, suggesting fragmentariness 
within a self-contained sphere.
17
 
 
In addition, when enquiring about the Blazing World’s religious community, the 
Empress finds many of their practices ‘very defective’ (p. 162); for example, she 
discovers that women are excluded from church assemblies because of what the priests 
consider to be ‘their importunate persuasions’ (p. 135), in spite of the priests’ claims 
that there is ‘no diversity of opinions’ as ‘they all had but one opinion concerning the 
worship and adoration of God’ (p. 135). She subsequently converts the Blazing World 
to her own religion, founds ‘a congregation of women’ and establishes ‘a well-ordered 
and settled condition’ in both church and state (pp. 162, 164-5). And yet she herself 
later acknowledges the disturbance her interventions have produced when, ‘troubled’ by 
the ‘contentions and divisions’ between its inhabitants, she reflects that the Blazing 
World ‘is not so quiet as it was at first’, fearing the conflicts will ‘break out into an open 
rebellion’ (p. 201). The Emperor’s gift of sovereignty thus seems double edged, 
eliciting unease alongside authority. Furthermore, little detail is given to either the 
familial or regal relationship between the Emperor and Empress. Indeed, for the first 
part of the narrative the Empress seems an isolated figure. The values of her world jostle 
with those of the Blazing World to produce dis-equilibrium and the world into which 
she escapes turns out not to offer a utopian refuge, providing her neither with autonomy, 
nor a wholly ideal community. 
 
  
II. Worlds within Worlds 
 
It is typical of friendship discourses to define ideal amity through its distinction from 
other types of relationship that are identified as being, in contrast, deficient in some 
way. So, for example, Aristotle’s somewhat utilitarian analysis of friendship explains 
that ‘in every community there is supposed to be ... some friendly feeling’, for 
friendship ‘seems to be the bond that holds communities together’.18 In turn, friendship 
is founded on the notion of community because ‘friends have all things in common’.19 
Therefore, according to Aristotle, friendship shares some features with other social 
bonds such as comradeship, citizenship, religious guilds, social clubs and various forms 
of familial relations. However, the latter are ‘secondary friendships’ in that the claims of 
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justice, duty and mutual benefit are often variable, unstable and disproportionate, 
varying in degree according to ‘the intensity of friendship’.20 By contrast, ideal 
friendship is founded on ‘equality and similarity’ of affection and goodness because 
each party ‘being steadfast in themselves, they are steadfast also towards each other’.21 
 
In an odd sort of way, The Blazing World follows a similar pattern in its framing of 
friendship. Various forms of social bonds are explored and found to be wanting. That is, 
until we reach the very centre of the text. At this point the Empress, having stretched her 
enquiries to her spirits about theological matters to their limit, decides ‘to make a 
Cabbala’ of her own (p. 179).22 Requiring the assistance of ‘a spiritual scribe’ in order 
to do so, she is advised by the spirits not to select the souls of famous learned men, such 
as Descartes, Hobbes and Henry More, because they are ‘so self-conceited, that they 
would scorn to be scribes to a woman’, and instead to invite the Duchess of Newcastle 
to take up this position on the grounds that ‘the principle of her writings, is sense and 
reason, and she will without question, be ready to do you all the service she can’ (pp. 
180-1). Like numerous accounts of amity, friendship’s starting point is thus textual.23 
And so the Duchess of Newcastle’s soul enters the Empress’s, which ‘embraced and 
saluted her with a spiritual kiss’ (p. 181), thereby bringing companionship into the 
Empress’s hitherto somewhat disconnected experience of community. It is here that the 
trope of friendship is fully played out as two in one and the idea of a utopian vision 
seems to be fully realised. 
 
Even though they begin in a hierarchical relationship where the Duchess is summoned 
to serve the Empress in her textual enterprise rather than being elected as a friend, this 
soon shifts to one of a more equalised, mutual and proportionate kind. Yet the fact that 
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the Empress begins the story as a commoner, while the Duchess enters with a status 
already in place and established outside the Blazing World, signals a more complex 
power relation between the Empress and Duchess than simply that of sovereign and 
subject. Nonetheless, to some extent their friendship also attests to Bacon’s view in ‘Of 
Followers and Friends’ that friendship, where it exists, tends to be between unequals, 
‘whose fortunes may comprehend the one the other’.24 Rather than simply following the 
Ciceronian ideal of parity in amity, theirs involves a negotiation between equality and 
inequality. The Duchess combines the role of monarchic advisor with the position also 
deemed crucial to ideal amity of offering ‘good counsel’, providing the honesty and 
wisdom vital to both.
25
 In this, the Empress follows Bacon’s observations in his essay 
‘Of Friendship’ in which he notes ‘how high a rate great kings and monarchs do set 
upon this fruit of friendship’, and how some of ‘the wisest and most politique that ever 
reigned’ have ‘raise[d] some persons to be as it were companions and almost equals to 
themselves’ ‘whom both themselves have called friends’.26 The reasons why this is so 
are indicated in his discussion about the ‘fruit of friendship’, which includes the 
provision of ‘faithful counsel’ together with assisting in making ‘daylight in the 
understanding, out of darkness and confusion of thoughts’.27 
 
The pertinence of such advice is suggested when the Duchess explains why the 
Empress’s own proposals to write a Jewish, philosophical, moral or political cabbala are 
problematic and guides her instead ‘to make a poetical or romancical Cabbala, wherein 
you can use metaphors, allegories, similitudes etc. and interpret them as you please’ (p. 
183). The Empress subsequently takes ‘her counsel’ and ‘made her also her favourite’ 
and this shortly produces ‘such an intimate friendship between them, that they became 
platonic lovers, although they were both females’ (p. 183).28 The term ‘favourite’ has 
negative connotations of course, smacking of partisanship, parasitism and indulgence. 
By placing this implicitly pejorative term alongside the ideal of  Platonism, Cavendish 
seems to be both playing with and reconfiguring friendship’s terms of intimacy, while at 
the same time drawing attention to the intricate politics of friendship and its potential 
erotics. Perhaps here, as David Wootton suggests in his analysis of Bacon’s essays on 
friendship, ‘the favourite needs to be interpreted as a special sort of friend’, rather than  
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the opposite of amity.
29 
Indeed, as we shall see, the Duchess comes to exemplify 
Bacon’s definition of a monarch’s special friend as being a partner in care (‘participes 
curarum’), rather than what are commonly understood as being mere ‘privadoes; as if it 
were matter of grace, or conversation’.30 Thus, the Blazing World itself is not the 
utopia, but rather provides the locus for redefining ideal friendship between two figures 
who enter it from outside and, within this alien domain, are enabled to reshape their 
identities through the merging of their souls. 
 
Moreover, far from producing misrule, factionality or calling the Empress’s ‘sovereign 
condition into question’, as Shannon suggests was the way in which early modern 
writers predominantly represented the friendships of monarchs, the Empress’s intimacy 
with the Duchess helps to secure her sovereign status by generating amicability within 
the society of the Blazing World more broadly.
31
 Possibly following Aristotle’s view 
that ‘concord seems to be something like friendship’, while ‘faction’ is ‘enmity’,32 
together with one of friendship’s ‘principal obligations’, which is to provide 
‘admonitions’ as part of one’s ‘counsels’ to one’s friend,33 the Duchess recommends the 
Empress ‘to dissolve all’ the societies she has created because of the ‘perpetual disputes 
and quarrels’ they cause, ‘for ‘tis better to be without their intelligences, than to have an 
unquiet and disorderly government’  (p. 202). If she takes this action, the Duchess 
reasons, the Empress will manifest wisdom and virtue, qualities fundamental to both 
perfect friendship and ideal sovereignty, in showing herself ‘so wise, as to perceive her 
own errors, and so good, as not to persist in them’ (p. 202).  
 
Holding ‘a very great esteem’ for the ‘just and impartial judgement’ of ‘her dear 
Platonic friend’, the Empress ‘willingly follow[s]’ the Duchess’s ‘advice’ and 
subsequently ‘lived and reigned most happily and blessedly’ (pp. 200, 202-203). In the 
process, she demonstrates a thorough grasp of the distinction between counterfeit and 
genuine friendship identified as being a crucial point of discrimination when choosing 
companions in Bacon’s essay on friendship, among others. Like Bacon’s ‘perfect and 
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ed. by Michael Grant (London: Penguin, 1971), pp. 175-227. (p. 220). 
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entire’ friend, as opposed to a flatterer, the Duchess is revealed to ‘speak as the case 
requires’,34 for by persuading the Empress ‘to alter her own decrees, acts and laws’ (p. 
202), the Duchess shows that ‘there is no such remedy against flattery of a man’s self, 
as the liberty of a friend’.35 Having achieved a harmonious government as a result of the 
Duchess’s ‘faithful admonition’,36 the Empress thus concludes at the end of the first part 
of the narrative that the Duchess is indeed ‘not a flattering parasite, but a true friend’ (p. 
202).
37
   
    
Nor is their friendship one-sided; it works for the mutual benefit of each party, ‘they 
being like several parts of one united body’ (p. 183). So, while cultivating an amicable 
world without, their friendship also produces a harmonious inner world within the 
Blazing World. We learn that there is ‘no concealment’ between the Empress and the 
Duchess, for ‘these two loving souls did often meet and rejoice in each other’s 
conversation’ (pp. 183, 202). Within this internal domain they enjoy Bacon’s ‘first fruit 
of friendship’, that is, the ‘communicating of a man’s self to his friend’, the result of 
which is to ‘redoubleth joys’ and cut ‘griefs in halfs’, something that for Montaigne is 
‘fostered by mutual confidences’.38  
    
Noticing one day that the Duchess seems ‘very sad’, the Empress, ‘very much troubled’ 
by this, enquires into ‘the reason of her melancholic humour’ (p. 183). The Duchess 
confides that it ‘proceeds from an extreme ambition ... that I would fain be as you are, 
that is, an Empress of a world’ (pp. 183-4). She thus pinpoints the difference in position 
between herself and the Empress, while also indicating her desire to be more like her in 
her wish to raise herself to an equal status. Following Cicero’s view of friendship 
between unequals that ‘the superior partner in a friendship’ is ‘under an obligation to do 
everything he can to lift the friend to his own level’, the Empress does not hesitate in 
offering to assist the Duchess, for ‘I love you so well ... that I wish with all my soul, you 
had the fruition of your ambitious desire’ (p. 184).39 As Montaigne suggests, the ideal 
friend ‘more than anything else’ seeks ‘the good of the other, so that the one who 
furnishes the means and occasion is in fact the more generous, since he gives his friend 
                                                 
34
 Bacon, Essays, pp. 395, 394, 396. 
35
 Bacon, Essays, p. 394. 
36
 Ibid., p. 394. 
37
 See Bacon’s essay ‘Of Friendship’ in which he distinguishes between ‘the counsel of a friend and of a 
flatterer’, p. 394. Bacon’s discussion closely follows Plutarch’s ‘How to tell a flatterer from a friend’, 
which also suggests that ‘everybody is himself his own foremost and greatest flatterer’, whereas a true 
friend ‘by doing always what he ought to do, is oftentimes agreeable and oftentimes disagreeable, not 
from any desire to be disagreeable, and yet not attempting to avoid even this if it be better’, for ‘when 
there is need of reprehension, he assails with stinging words and all the frankness of a guardian’; see 
Plutarch, Moralia, trans. and ed. by Frank Cole Babbitt and others, 16 vols (London: Heinemann; 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1927-2004), I (1927), pp. 265, 295, 297. 
38
 See Bacon, Essays, p. 393 and Montaigne, p. 207. 
39
 Cicero, pp. 212-3. 
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the joy of performing for him what he most desires’.40 So the Duchess’s desire 
counterbalances the Empress’s wish to help her friend in enabling her both to perform a 
beneficent act on her behalf and to make them more equal.  
    
Just as the Duchess gives her faithful counsel, so the Empress provides ‘her dearest 
friend’ with ‘my best advice how to accomplish’ this task (p. 184), calling upon the help 
of her immaterial spirits. Having discounted the possibility of the Duchess becoming an 
empress of one of the existing terrestrial worlds, the spirits suggest instead that the 
Duchess ‘create your self a celestial world ... for every human creature can create an 
immaterial world ... within the compass of the head or scull; nay, not only so, but he 
may create a world of what fashion and government he will’ (p. 185).41 
    
The counsel she receives therefore parallels that which she previously gives to the 
Empress when she suggests that she should create her own cabbala and interpret its 
figures at her own pleasure rather than being subject to the dictates of external ones. 
Similarly, a self-created world gives the Duchess the advantage of being able to ‘make 
what world you please, and alter it when you please, and enjoy as much pleasure and 
delight as a world can afford you’ (p. 186). Thus, having tried out various models ‘in 
the framing of her world’ and finding that ‘no patterns would do her any good’, she 
resolves instead ‘to make a world of her own invention’ (p. 188). And so the internal 
sphere of the head becomes the location for such a world, apparently enabling liberty of 
desire, will and imagination, together with absolute control over what is contained 
within it. Where for Montaigne perfect friendship ‘is a matter of the mind’, here the 
mind is identified as being a self-defining arena.
42
 
    
Not only does the Duchess immediately ‘take’ the spirits’ ‘advice’ to ‘create a world of 
my own’, but the Empress too (p. 186). Consequently the spirits ‘left these two ladies to 
create two worlds within themselves: who did also part from each other, until such time 
as they had brought their worlds to perfection’ (p. 186). However, the Empress is ‘so 
ravished’ by the Duchess’s world that ‘her soul desired to live in’ it (pp. 188-9). The 
Duchess, in what seems to be a singularly un-amicable gesture, is not having any of it, 
though, and ‘persuaded’ the Empress instead ‘to make such another world in her own 
mind’ (p. 189). Imitating her friend and following her advice thus involves partition. 
The Empress and the Duchess are both equal and alike in being sovereigns of self-
                                                 
40
 Montaigne, p. 214. 
41
 This seems to be an extension of the spirits’ idea that each creature, including man, is ‘a little world’ 
(pp. 169-70). Pohl notes that ‘the motto “I made a world of my own”’, which is also identified in 
Cavendish’s Epistle to The Blazing World, ‘echoes that kind of expansionist vision’ signalled in Robert 
Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621) ; see pp. 35-6. 
42
 Montaigne, p. 209. 
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created internal worlds, but different and separate in that they construct these domains 
independently, suggesting individual rather than mutual choices or ‘the total interfusion 
of ... wills’.43 While for Montaigne perfect friendship indicates a standard paradox in 
which possession of amity signals the dispossession of a differentiated identity, for 
‘nothing was his or mine’ and ‘having captured my will’, he ‘brought it to plunge into 
his and lose itself’, in The Blazing World the Duchess and Empress’s friendship implies 
no such loss, but rather inaugurates a double gain of entry into the other’s soul together 
with an individual identity that is self-contained.
44
 
    
The values of ideal friendship and the utopian vision they embody are complicated, 
then, almost as soon as they are introduced. In a reversal of amity’s customary practice 
in which the two amicable selves should first be integral and complete within 
themselves before merging as one, here the mingling of their souls is the means by 
which the Empress and Duchess become autonomous agents.
45
 By each creating 
independent dominions within their internal world of friendship, they both mirror each 
other and highlight their divisibility. Nor does their autonomy signal a ‘steadfast’ 
identity,
46
 as is conventionally the case when preparing to enter the bonds of ideal 
friendship, but rather mutability and flexibility, premised on pleasure rather than virtue. 
Within this context, they cease to be dependent on the knowledge of others; nor are they 
subject to external codes, values or persons, including those of friendship, but simply to 
their own self-determined, transmutable desires, for they can create, dissolve and 
transform their worlds at their own leisure and as often as they like. Their self-created 
domains, then, are distinct from friendship itself, even though friendship is the starting 
point that enables their production. 
   
 
III. Worlds Within and Worlds Without 
 
Not only does desire complicate friendship’s bonds as a result of the internal arena of 
the mind, though, but also through external factors. While Montaigne suggests that in 
perfect friendship ‘each completely’ holds ‘the reins of each other’s desires’, The 
Blazing World wittily questions the possibility of this and highlights the negotiations 
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 Shannon discusses this prerequisite for entering ideal friendship in early modern texts, in which 
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13 
 
friendship must make with outside concerns.
47
 The Duchess’s name itself reminds us of 
how her identity is fundamentally connected to that of her husband and the values of the 
world she has left behind: it signals both the social status conferred on her through 
marriage and the duties that implicitly go with her title.
48
 The Empress, indeed, seems to 
acknowledge this herself early on when, in spite of their ‘intimate friendship’, she gives 
the Duchess ‘leave to return to her husband and kindred into her native world’, provided 
‘that her soul ... visit her now and then’ (p. 183). But recognition of these external 
obligations also makes her ‘desirous to see the world the Duchess came from’ (p. 189). 
So, ‘Those two female souls travelled together as lightly as two thoughts into the 
Duchess her native world’ (p. 190). Thus, they seem to operate as a self-contained 
sphere outside of the Blazing World as well as within it. 
    
Once there, though, the bonds of friendship are tested and amicable ties are loosened by 
marital ones, ties that suggest not only duty, but also those of affection and eroticism, 
for the Duchess expresses ‘an extreme desire to converse with the soul of her noble lord 
and dear husband’ (p. 192). Indeed, so strong is this desire that it causes her to lose ‘any 
consideration of the Empress’s soul’ (especially in reference to his well-being after she 
witnesses him exercising with his sword just before eating), driving her instead to leave 
‘her aerial vehicle’ and enter ‘into her lord’, only to be followed shortly, and somewhat 
farcically, by the Empress: ‘and then the Duke had three souls in one body’ (p. 194).  
    
This triadic convergence of Platonic souls does not lead, however, to ‘concordance and 
harmony’ with the holy trinity, as Cavendish’s contemporary Henry More suggests in  
relation to the journey of the soul in his influential version of  neo-platonism,
49 
but to 
the all too human, discordant emotion of jealousy on the Duchess’s part when the souls 
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 Montaigne, p. 213. 
48
 Both the Empress and the Duchess make much of the details of the Duchess’s place in the social 
hierarchy when the Duchess expresses her desire to be an empress. 
49
 Henry More, ‘To the Reader Upon the first Canto of Psychozoia’, in Philosophical Poems, Facsimile 
reprint of the 1647 edition (Menston: The Scolar Press, 1969), sig. B8-B8v. In this work More refers to 
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More as the reviver of a sacred wisdom deriving ultimately from the ancient Jews, a “Cabbala” which it 
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Crocker, ‘Mysticism and Enthusiasm in Henry More’, in Henry More (1614-1687): Tercentenary Studies, 
ed. by Sarah Hutton (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), pp. 137-55 (p. 141). A. Jacob 
asserts that A Platonick Song of the Soul (1642, included in More’s Philosophical Poems 1647), of which 
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‘Introduction’, in Henry More The Immortality of the Soul, ed. by A. Jacob (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1987), pp. i-xcii (pp. v, viii). Cavendish was certainly familiar with Henry More’s ideas and those of the 
Cambridge Platonists, responding specifically to More’s work in her philosophical writing and even 
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of the Empress and the Duke ‘became enamoured of each other’ (p. 194), an exchange 
that seems to disrupt the notion that friendship is ‘enjoyed in proportion to our desire’.50 
  
Remembering, though, ‘that Platonism was divine, as being derived from divine Plato’, 
the Duchess reassures herself that ‘no adultery could be committed’ between them and 
conveniently ‘cast forth’ her jealousy almost as quickly as it arrives (pp. 194-5). Even 
so, the narrator creates a somewhat troubling, if wonderfully absurd, image when she 
ruminates that had the Duke had ‘some such souls more’ he ‘would have been like the 
Grand Signior in his seraglio, only it would have been a platonic seraglio’ (p. 194). This 
reminds us of the lurking issue of bodily desire and how the corporeal refuses to be so 
easily detached from the chaste soul, a matter that is also notably acknowledged in 
Plato’s Symposium when the drunken Alcibiades interrupts Socrates’s account of 
Diotima’s discourse on ‘the mysteries’ of ‘the rites of love’, which is presented as an 
ascent from the body towards ‘divine beauty’, and signals the ‘great mass of mortal 
rubbish’ such an ideal notion excludes (pp. 47, 49). Furthermore, the amatory interplay 
between soul and body is suggested earlier in Cavendish’s narrative when, on catching 
sight of her husband, the ‘aerial vehicle’ carrying the Duchess’s soul ‘became so 
splendorous, as if it had been enlightened by the sun; by which we may perceive, that 
the passions of souls or spirits can alter their bodily vehicles’ (p. 194).51  
    
Cavendish’s philosophical writing indeed makes explicit her monistic view that the 
body cannot be separated from the soul.
52
 In Philosophical Letters, for example, she 
                                                                                                                                               
sending a presentation copy of her Philosophical Letters (1664) to him, of which four sections are 
devoted to challenging his views. Hutton convincingly demonstrates that ‘Henry More’s part in Blazing 
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neo-platonic view that ‘upon release from the earthly body, the soul “transmigrates” into either an aerial 
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of  any Vehicles’; for both quotations see Broad, p. 60. Cf. More’s The Immortality of the Soul (1659), 
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detailed discussion about Cavendish’s critique of More’s philosophical writing, see Broad, pp. 35-64, 
Hutton, pp. 185-98 and Sarasohn, pp. 135-41. 
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specifically counters Henry More’s dualistic perspective that the body and soul are 
distinct, even if united, entities, asserting ‘that I am no Platonick; for this opinion is 
dangerous, especially for married Women, by reason the conversation of the Souls may 
be a great temptation, and a means to bring Platonick Lovers to a neerer acquaintance, 
not allowable by the Laws of Marriage, although by the sympathy of the Souls’.53 As 
Jacqueline Broad suggests, Cavendish shows here that ‘she does not believe that “the 
conversation of Souls” is a completely disembodied exercise, but must inevitably lead 
to a more carnal kind of relationship’, thus placing the bonds of friendship in direct 
competition with those of marriage, while also suggesting the potentially erotic 
overtones of amicable relations.
54
 
    
Moreover, once the Duchess has recovered from her lapse into jealousy, the exchange 
between the three souls does not ‘give birth’ to Diotima’s concept of ‘divine beauty 
itself’, but rather generates the rather less grandiose outcome of ‘pleasant’ conversation, 
even if this intercourse transcends the bounds of mortal dialogue in paradoxically being 
‘so pleasant, that it cannot be expressed’ (p. 195).55 However, such colloquy is not 
enough to satisfy the Empress’s desires. In a way that both reflects and deviates from 
friendship’s mirroring, the Empress’s enjoyment of this Platonic threesome comes to a 
sudden halt when, ironically paralleling the Duchess’s earlier desire to be with the 
Duke, her soul grows ‘sad and melancholy, for want of’ the Emperor’s ‘beloved soul’ 
(p. 195), even though he does not know that her soul is absent and has not been 
mentioned directly since giving her absolute power. However, she only returns after 
agreeing to assist the Duchess in ‘her desire’ to reconcile the difference between the 
Duke and Fortune, so as to make them ‘friends’ (p. 196). The Empress thus helps to set 
up a trial between Fortune and her friends and those of the Duke in order to settle this 
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dispute, albeit partially, before she is reunited with the Emperor. The text, then, troubles 
the notion of a self-contained, exclusive union of friendship by insisting that it 
negotiates with the complexities of marital ties and that it extends its reach to help foster 
a network of friendly relations connected to those ties, while at the same time allowing 
the amicability of two in one to be sustained.  
    
However, not only must friendship interact with bonds of this kind, it must also 
accommodate other sets of interests. Having settled state affairs in the Blazing World, 
the Empress is ‘extremely troubled’ to discover that a war is raging in her native 
country, ESFI, and decides to intervene (p. 203). While the Emperor offers her ‘all the 
assistance which the Blazing World was able to afford’ (p. 203), his suggestions as to 
how to address military matters are dismissed by the Empress as impracticable: that is, 
apart from his final one, which is to consult ‘your dear Platonic friend the Duchess of  
Newcastle’ because of ‘her good and profitable counsels’ (p. 204). He therefore requests 
the Empress ‘to send for her soul, and confer with her about this business’ (p. 204). At 
this point the Emperor retreats into the shadows and allows the dynamic force of 
friendship to take centre stage when, once again, the Duchess’s role of intimate friend 
embraces that of  political advisor as she and the Empress immediately enter into 
‘serious council’ about military strategy (p. 205). 
 
As with her husband, the Empress at first questions the Duchess’s advice, but unlike the 
Emperor, her friend remains ‘steadfast’,56 insisting that the Empress ‘have but a little 
patience, and rely upon my advice’, as a result of which ‘you shall not fail to save your 
own native country’ (p. 206). The internal sphere of amicability, in which the Empress 
‘loved the Duchess as her own soul’ (p. 206), thus becomes the means through which 
the Empress can also outwardly demonstrate her commitment to public duty by 
‘show[ing] the greatness of her love and affection which she bore to her native country’ 
(p. 205). Remaining as two in one when the Empress confirms that ‘Your soul ... shall 
live with my soul, in my body’ in their expedition to ESFI (p. 206), they thus face the 
challenge of warfare as a united front. 
    
Nor are they thwarted by the obstacles they confront when, for example, having 
conquered ‘all the several navies of the enemies’ (p. 211), they must then find a means 
of releasing traffic and trade to ESFI. Indeed, they deploy a ‘no holds barred’ military 
policy, involving, with the help of the Blazing World’s creatures, destruction, carnage, 
‘fire’, ‘force’ and ‘a total ruin’ of all adversaries in order to generate from the ashes the 
‘miraculous delivery’ of  ESFI and to secure it as ‘the absolute monarchy of all that 
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world’ (pp. 211-14). Through these apocalyptic means, not only do the friends 
transform ESFI, but also the Empress’s relationship to her native country. She does not 
merely return as ‘a great and powerful princess’, having been ‘a subject of this 
kingdom’, which, as she informs us, ‘is but a small part of this world’, but obtains the 
status of ‘some celestial creature, or rather an uncreated goddess’ (pp. 209-10, 215).  
 
Through her amicable relations with the Duchess, her identity is metamorphosed both 
within the domain of friendship and without it, enabling her to act out the role of public 
saviour by giving her agency within her native world where before she had none.
57
 
What this episode makes clear, then, if it was not before, is that the Duchess and 
Empress’s friendship does not entail withdrawal into a self-contained utopian retreat, 
but is the source of vita activa and direct engagement with public life. 
 
 
IV. Prologue and Epilogue 
 
If this interconnection between inner and outer worlds is apparent within the fabric of 
the narrative, so it is within the text more broadly. In the Prologue and Epilogue to the 
reader the speaker’s internal ‘world of my own creating’ is explicitly brought into the 
public arena to be actively shared with, among other inhabitants of the world external to 
it, ‘my noble female friends’ (p. 124). The relations the speaker sets up with her 
audience indeed establish a framework of amicability where belligerence is to be 
avoided at all costs: the Blazing World is presented as an exemplar of ‘a peaceable’ 
domain in which there is no discord, and the speaker further demands that ‘the world I 
have made’ should not be usurped (p. 224-5). In turn, she offers to ‘delight’ her readers 
with the ‘variety’ of her work of ‘fancy’ and, through this act of generosity, will receive 
the reward of bestowing pleasure on her audience, for ‘if it add any satisfaction to you, I 
shall account my self a happy creatoress’ (p. 124). She thus invites her readers either to 
join her world and become her subjects or, alternatively, to instigate through their 
reading of The Blazing World the possibility to ‘create worlds of their own’ (pp. 224-5), 
thereby granting her audience both entry into her self-created community and 
autonomy. 
    
Furthermore, in her Epilogue the figure of the Duchess within the narrative is directly 
connected to the writer without and her ‘ambition’ to be ‘Authoress of a whole world’ 
(p. 224). This world, however, is not simply the product of the internal sphere of  
‘fancy, framed in [her] own mind, according as [she] pleases’ (p. 123), but is presented 
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alongside ‘my serious philosophical contemplations’ which are the result of ‘searching 
and enquiring after the causes of natural effects’; that is, Cavendish’s Observations 
Upon Experimental Philosophy, which appeared alongside The Blazing World. The text 
is therefore presented as two in one, in which Observations and The Blazing World are 
‘joined ... as two worlds at the ends of their poles’ (pp. 123-4).58 It embraces different 
perspectives and sets of interests, while issuing from a single ‘Authoress’ (p. 224). 
Rather than being at odds, these different worlds of philosophy and fancy are placed in 
an amicable relation, suggesting affinity within differentiation as they both derive from 
the same source as ‘effects, or rather actions of the rational parts of matter’ (pp. 123-4). 
Indeed, both assist and benefit each other, for philosophy ‘requires sometimes the help 
of fancy, to recreate the mind, and withdraw it from its more serious contemplations’ (p. 
124).  
    
As if to mirror this textual relation, in the Epilogue we are informed that the Empress 
remains the Duchess’s ‘dear Platonic friend’, even though the Empress’s rule over the 
Blazing World is clearly demarcated from the Duchess’s over her philosophical world 
(p. 225). Indeed, the Duchess promises not ‘to disturb’ or ‘depose’ the Empress’s 
government, even though she created her world, and concludes the text by opening up 
the possibility of creating ‘another world for another friend’ (p. 225). Friendship, then, 
is given the last word, but is presented as a unity that enables individual autonomy, 
works alongside community and refuses exclusivity. 
    
The Blazing World thus uses the utopian mode in order to investigate contemporaneous 
discourses of friendship and the classical ideas that informed them so as to produce its 
own witty take on these. In turn, friendship becomes the location for discussion about 
what a utopia might comprise. Instead of elevating amity as a self-contained ideal with 
its own autonomous principles, Cavendish’s version of friendship is required to 
accommodate the individuated internal worlds of each party and actually enables each 
to produce self-created domains. Furthermore, the text demands that amicable relations 
interact with types of community other than its own and engage directly with 
attachments each friend holds elsewhere. Just as Cavendish views the soul as being tied 
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to the body, friendship is fundamentally linked to the world outside it, each having the 
capacity to transform and be transformed by the other. Friendship, then, must operate as 
a world within other worlds to which it is connected, not separate, and must adapt and 
recast itself in reference to competing interests and potentially discordant concerns. 
Conversely, it has the ability to reshape the world external to it through the dynamic 
energy of its own affective values. In this, disengagement from the outside into an 
imaginary no place is shown to be neither possible nor desirable. Rather the utopia of 
The Blazing World presents a negotiation between autonomy, companionship and 
community that is born out of amity. 
 
